Case: State of Maharashtra vs Arjun Tabadu Mahajan - 1988 (1) BomCR 603
The Range Forest Officer, Shahada, filed a complaint before JM (First Class), against 49 persons (Arjun Tabadu Mahajan and Ors.) under Section 26(1)(d), for trespassing and permitting 260 cattle to graze in the reserved forest. All the cattle were seized.
The accused pleaded guilty in front of the Magistrate and they were convicted. Magistrate further ordered that the cattle seized in the case to be confiscated to the state.
Aggrieved by the order, the respondents appealed to the Sessions Court which held that the requirement of Section 55 is that the offence must be committed in respect of timber of forest produce and the offence under Section 26(1)(d) is not against timber or wood. The Sessions Court set aside the order passed by the Magistrate.
The petitioner contended that the interpretation of the provision of Section 55 of IFA by Additional Sessions Judge is not correct and on proper interpretation, the learned Magistrate was right.
Judgment:
- Section 55 makes it clear that all timber of forest produce which is not the property of Government and in respect of which a forest offence has been committed, shall be liable by order of the convicting court of forfeiture. The other part of the section states that all tools, boats, vehicles and cattle are also liable to forfeiture.
- Forest offence has been defined in Section 2(3) of IFA to mean an offence punishable under the Act. Therefore the offence under Section 26(1)(d) is also forest offence and any cattle used in committing forest offence is liable for forfeiture.
- The words used in Section 55 are not any such offence but any forest offence and, there fore the cattle that is liable for forfeiture cannot be restricted only to such of them which is concerned with forest offence committed in respect of only timber.
- For offences under IFA, the complainant should always give evidence of the actual damage caused to the forest with a view to enabling the Court to award proper compensation. That would facilitate the court to decide whether order of forfeiture under Section 55 should be passed or not.
- The words used in Section 55 to the effect shall be liable by order of convicting Court to forfeiture, vest the discretion with the trial Court.
Case: Karnataka Forest Development Corporation Ltd vs M/s Contreads Private Limited and Others - AIR 1994 SC 2218
A Private limited company negotiated with the State of Karnataka in 1979 for supply of 60 tonnes of natural rubber of grade RMA I to V per month for a period of five years. A year later State Forest Corporation was constituted. The State, therefore, transferred the liability of supply of the quota of rubber to the Corporation. In the meantime the Chief Conservator of Forest issued notification fixing seigniorage on raw smoked rubber. The State Government informed the company, that the supply of rubber from 9.1.1981 onwards would be at the rate mentioned in the orders made by the Chief Conservator.
The company challenged that fixation of the seigniorage by the Chief Conservator of Forests by a writ petition filed in the High Court. It was held that the natural rubber, which has been agreed to be purchased by the Company from the Corporation or the State, being in the shape of RMA sheets, was not forest produce.
On appeal the Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge that latex, which is the natural produce, hardened by application of the sulphuric acid and given the shape or form of sheets and thereafter dried with the help of smoke resulted in bringing out a commodity which was different from latex, and therefore, no tax could be levied on it.
Judgment:
- Latex is the modern name for caoutchouc. It is nothing but natural rubber. Caoutchouc or latex means not only milky substance obtained from the trees but it included all milk substance processed, till it is made marketable.
- Since the processing does not result in bringing out a new commodity but it preserves the same and renders it fit for being marketed. It does not change its character.
- It was caoutchouc or latex when it was obtained from the trees, it continued to be caoutchouc or latex when it was treated by sulphuric acid and continued to be so even after it is dried with smoke to obtain the shape of sheets.
- It is the understanding or the knowledge of the item by the common man or persons dealing it in the market and not in the technical or botanical sense as the deciding factor.
- Thus rubber sheets/mats is forest produce within the meaning of sec 2 (4).
Case: Forest Range Officer vs Mohammed Ali - 1994 AIR 120, 1993 SCR (3) 497
To be seen with respect to Kerala Forest Act, 1961
The respondent, Mohammed Ali was found manufacturing and in possession of sandalwood oil. The respondent contented that sandalwood oil is not a forest produce on the basis that it is a by-product of industrial processing of heart wood and roots of sandalwood trees whereas wood oil means, it is an exudation from living trees.
Judgement:
- In technical terms, wood oil only means exudation obtained from trunk of trees of family Dipterocarpaceae.
- There is no compelling circumstance to give such a restricted meaning.
- Hence, sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning of the Section 2(4)(a).
Case: Ramanuj Pandey and Others vs State of Bihar
- The petitioners in the case is the owner of the truck carrying quicklime which were seized at Tilauthu Check post in the district of Rohtas.
- According to the State authorities Tilauthu check post is within Nawadih protected forest. The truck was unauthorisedly and illegally carrying quicklime which is a forest produce and, therefore, both the truck and its consignment were liable to seizure and confiscation under the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.
- The case of the petitioner is that quicklime is not a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act and, therefore/the seizure of the quicklime and the truck and the consequent proceedings for the confiscation were illegal and without jurisdiction.
- Therefore, the question that falls for consideration in this case is whether or not quicklime which is obtained by heating lime stones is a forest produce within the meaning of the Act.
Judgement:
- According to Section 2(4)(b), peat, surface soil, rock and minerals including lime-stone are forest produce when found in or brought from a forest.
- In support of his contention, petitioner solely relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra , and he practically argued the entire case on the basis of that decision.
- Suresh Lohiya was a case of bamboo mat and the question before the Court was whether bamboo mat could be held to be a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4)(b)(i) and (ii).
- Unlike quicklime which would fall under Sub-clause (iv), the question whether bamboo mat is a forest produce was being considered under the provisions of Sub-clauses (i) and (ii). The decision in Suresh Lohiya did not accept the submission that the expression produce also included an article in other than its native state in the context of Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) but expressly approved the submission in so far Sub-clause (iv) was concerned.
- It, therefore, appears plain and clear to me that quicklime is undoubtedly covered by the expression product of mines or quarries and it squarely falls under Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (b) of Section 2(4) of the Act.
- Moreover, it is well known that quicklime is obtained by simply heating lime stones. It, therefore, appears to me that the process by which quicklime is obtained can hardly be said to be so elaborate or complicated as to disturb its proximity with the article found in the natural state.
Case: Sheikh Tausif vs State of Madhya Pradesh
Case has been registered against Abdul Waheed Ansari and Babulal on the allegations that they were fishing in the reservoir of Pench National Park, Chhindwara. The fish along with the jeep carrying the fish were seized. The seized items belong to the petitioner. This case relates to the interim release of the vehicle.
Judgment:
- The definition of Forest produce according to IFA includes wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey, and wax, and all other parts of produce of animals.
- The meaning of wild animal is given under Wildlife Protection Act - Wild animal means any animal found wild in nature and includes any animal specified in Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III, Schedule IV or Schedule V.
- Whereas Wild life includes any animal, bees, butterflies, Crustacea, fish and moths, and aquatic or land vegetation which forms part of any habitat.
- In view of Clauses 36 and 37 of Section 2 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, the fish is not wild animal but wild life.
- So confiscation of vehicle is not applicable as it is not provided for under WPA.
- Trial Court has jurisdiction to consider the application for the release of the vehicle on Supurdnama as per law laid down by Full Bench of this Court in Madhukar Raos case
Case: Indian Wood Products Co. Ltd vs State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1999 All 222
A vehicle carrying Kattha was stopped at a check post by Forest Range Officer. The vehicle and the Kattha were seized as there was no transit permit obtained for the transport of the same. The petitioner claims that the product that was being transported was Mill Kattha, which is a resultant of prolonged industrial process done in a town/city and it is not a forest produce u/s 2(4) of Indian Forest Act. As a result there is no need to obtain transit pass from the Forest department for transport of Mill Kattha
Judgment:
- In the Forest Act there is no mention of a natural forest produce.
- Subsection 4 of section 2 clearly mentions that forest produce will include catchu irrespective of it being obtained from a forest or not. The kattha is Hindi equivalence of Catechu.
- Even factory produced kattha or catechu is a forest produce within the meaning of the Act.
- The petitioner is involved in an offence under section 52 of the Indian Forest Act for possessing illegally forest timber.
- The Range Forest Officer, soon after seizure of the illegally cut wood, recorded the statements of those accused and it was disclosed from those statements that all the accused were involved in cutting, removing and possessing the illegally cut wood.
- The learned Magistrate observed that the statements of other accused, implicating the present petitioner, were not admissible as they were hit under section 30 of the Evidence Act. It was further observed that those statements are in the nature of confession and the same are hit under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
- The State, having been aggrieved by this discharge of the petitioner, appealed under section 59A of the Indian Forest Act. The learned Sessions Judge, Panaji, in the above proceedings found that the approach of the learned Magistrate was erroneous; that it was incorrect in law to say that the statements of the accused were not admissible because the Range Forest Officer is not a police officer.
- The petitioner, who is the accused, has preferred this revision and the main thrust of argument on behalf of the petitioner is that except the statements made by the petitioner and other accused before the Range Forest Officer there was no other evidence and in that light, the order of discharge was wholly warranted and that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge should be quashed.
Judgement:
- The Bombay High Court stated that the competency of the Range Forest Officer to record the statements has not been disputed.
- Section 72 of IFA empowers the Range Forest Officer to carry out the search under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In sub-section (2) of section 72, it is laid down that the evidence recorded by the Forest Officer shall be admissible in any subsequent trial before the Magistrate provided that it has been taken in presence of the accused persons.
- The learned P.P. has relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in in the case of Baduka Joti Svant v. The State of Mysore and Attorney General of India. The provisions of section 21 of the Central Excise and Salt Act were referred to and the Court has observed that the statements made by an accused person to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise would not be affected by section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was held that the officers were not empowered to file charge sheet under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence ex-facie, the above provision of section 21 cannot be read as the customs officers being police officers.
- The Range Forest Officer has clearly stated that these were the statements made by the respective accused persons, including the petitioner and hence there was prima facie offence established against the petitioner.
- It must also be observed that the statements made by the accused are not confessions under section 25 of the Evidence Act. It is only the confession under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act which can not be read against the co-accused but such is not the situation in this case because the statements before the Range Forest Officer are not the statements recorded under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act as the Range Forest Officer is not a police officer.
Case: Ahmadji vs State of Madhya Pradesh - AIR 1986 MP 1
A truck loaded with Mango tree logs, owned by Ahmadji, was seized from a saw mill at night. One Idu Khan was in the truck. Since no transit pass was produced, the truck along with logs of wood was seized under Sections 41 and 42 of Indian Forest Act.
Idu Khan expressed a desire to compound the offence, and the Divisional Forest Officer compounded the offence and confiscated the truck under the Section 68 read with Section 55 of IFA. Ahmadji filed an application before CJM for the release of truck. The CJM held that the court has no jusidiction as the matter was compounded by the DFO.
Upon filing of Misc. Criminal case, the court held that a fresh application can be made by the petitioner and magistrate can pass necessary order for the release of truck as no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner earlier. Accordingly the CJM passed an order for the release of truck. Three days later, the DFO again confiscated the truck after issuing show cause notice. Later the court held that the remedy for the fresh confiscation was to appeal against the order of DFO under Section 52A of amended IFA.
Petitioner instead filed petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
Judgment:
- The logs of mango trees come within the definition of the forest produce.
- Under Section 55 of original IFA, the order for confiscation can be passed only by the Magistrate, and not by the DFO.
- Under the amended Indian Forest (M.P. Amendment) Act 1983, the Authorised officer can co0nfiscate the forest produce and the vehicle used for committing the offence.
Provision for appeal and revision are provided in Section 52A and 52B respectively. Secion 52C of amended IFA bars the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with disposal of forest produce and vehicle, after a due intimation received from DFO about initiation of confiscation proceedings.
- Amendment to the Indian Forest Act cannot be applied retrospectively.
- The court held that the vehicle should be released as per the order of CJM after executing a Supradnama, and the order of confiscation by DFO had been quashed.
Case: Barkat and Others vs State of Madhya Pradesh
Adivasis and residents of forest village Chainpura in the reserved forest area who are engaged in rearing and grazing cattle were restrained from making collection of Gobar (dung) excreted by the cattle, grazed by them in the reserved forest area to which they were licensed to and moving the collected quantity of such excrement of domestic cattle from the reserved forest for disposing of the same. The forest department contends that Dung from cattle grazed in Reserve Forest becomes forest produce under Section 2(4) - (iii) wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey and wax and all other parts of produce of animal, and (iv) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including limestone, taterite, mineral oils and oil products of mines or quarries).
Judgment:
- Two expressions all other parts of produce of animal and the surface soil, found in or brought from the forest refers to natural occurrence in the forest.
- Dung excreted by the domestic cattle which are taken in the forest area for grazing under licence is not included within the meaning of forest produce
- They are entitled to collect and carry the same out of the forest area without any necessity of obtaining the transit pass.
Case: Bihar Plywood Manufacturers vs State of Bihar - AIR 2004 Pat 17, 2003 (3) BLJR 2251
The petitioners being manufacturers of plywood, transport veneer under mill challan to their factories either within the State of Bihar or outside the State. Before being taken out of the factory excise duty is paid on the manufacture of veneer. Further case of the petitioners is that no rule or regulation has been framed by the State Government nor there is any enactment authorising the officers of the Forest Department to interfere with the manufacture/transport of veneer from one place to another. However, without any authority of law they insist on obtaining of transit permit for taking veneer from one place to other either within the State or outside the State on the plea that veneer is a forest produce and as such the Department is competent to issue transit permit without which it cannot be moved from one place to another. The question is whether Veneer is a forest produce or not
Judgement:
- Veneer, as contended on behalf of the petitioner, is certainly not a part of the tree in its natural form. It is the result of a mechanical process and human labour. It is also true that it is a distinct commodity in commercial world
- It is not the end product or final product. It is in fact a raw material for making plywood.
- In terms of Section 2(6) of the Forest Act all wood - whether fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not - are timber and therefore, forest produce under Section 2(4).
- Merely because layers are extracted by mechanical process or as a result of human labour it does not mean that it looses its identity as timber.
- Therefore, Veneer is a forest produce.
Case: Mahendra Nath Pathak vs State of Assam
To be seen with respect to Assam Forest Regulation (5 of 1891).
Appeal to set aside decision of the Government to award a Sand Mahal to one of the opposite parties overruling the settlement made by the Conservator of Forests with the Petitioner
Judgement:
- The definition of Forest Produce as given in given in Assam Forest Regulation is not exhaustive.
- Surface soil is explicitly mentioned as a forest produce and sand is also to be considered as a forest produce
- Sand in the land at the disposal of the Government is a forest produce.
Case: Kasi Prasad Sahu vs State of Orissa
Orissa Timber and Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1958 required permit from authorized forest officials for transit of mahua flowers even though collected from lands of parties. The petitioner Shri Kasi Prasad Sahu was aggrieved by the rules.
Judgment:
- The government has regulatory power to control movement of forest produce even though the produce may not be the property of Government.
Also the Rules do not affect the freedom of Profession(article 19(g)) or freedom of trade.
Case: Forest Range Officer vs Aboobacker and another - 1989 CriLJ 2038
- On receipt of information about hunting a wild animal the forest officials went to the house of the accused. As the first accused was absent in the house, the Range Officer interrogated the respondents (who were the second and third accused in the trial Court).
- They admitted that the bison was shot dead by them and its flesh was sold in open market. The Chief Judicial Magistrate sentenced them to six months based on the confession statements made by the respondents before the Range Officer.
- On appeal, the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction saying that the confessional statements cannot be relied on.
Judgment:
- Forest is an area where human activities are scanty. Insistence on the rule of corroboration by independent evidence for offence relating to forests and wild life will make the perpetrators go scot free.
- There is no rule that evidence should not be relied on unless there is corroboration. There is no legal requirement that whenever a confession is reduced to writing it must also be attested by another witness.
- The admissibility of the confession made to the Forest Range Officer is not open to doubt since Section 25 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to it.
- Forest Officers, though they are invested with some of the police powers, are not Police Officers. Hence they can give evidence before Court regarding admissions or confessions made to them by accused persons, whether or not such persons were then in custody.
This decision was upheld in Dr.Emerico DSouza vs State.
Case: Abdul Aziz vs Union Territory of Tripura - 1963 CriLJ 558
- The petitioner , Abdul Aziz was detected by the Plantation Watcher peeling off the bark of a Sal tree within a Protected Forest after he had cut down the tree.
- When plantation watcher tried to arrest him for the forest offence, the petitioner gave a blow with a dao causing injury and then ran away from the place.
- The petitioner was convicted by the lower court for Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension(sec 224 IPC) and Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means(sec 324 IPC).
Contention by the petitioner:
- Plantation Watcher is a private person and was not empowered to arrest the petitioner under the Indian Forest Act.
- So the petitioner was entitled for his right of private defence to free himself from the clutches of plantation watcher.
- So hurting the plantation watcher was no offence either under Section 224 or 324 I.P.C.
Judgement:
- Power to arrest without warrant under section 64 of IFA makes the offences under section 33(1)(a) cognisable.
- But Section 65 shows that any person arrested could be released on his executing a bond to appear before a magistrate. Hence, it is clear that the offence is not a non-bailable offence.
- It follows that a private person cannot arrest under Section 59 Cr.P.C. for a forest offence.
- Plantation watcher is appointed by the Divisional Forest Officer who has been empowered to appoint Forest Officers.
- If a plantation Watcher sees a person cutting down a protected tree from a plantation, he has to protect such trees. He is carrying out the purpose of the Indian Forest Act.
- So a Plantation Watcher is a Forest officer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
Case: Mahadeo s/o Rajaramji Mahadule vs State of Maharashtra - AIR 2001 Bom 434, 2001 (3) MhLj 379
The petitioner has approached the Court seeking quashing the Circular dated 24-10-1986 issued by the Government of Maharashtra, Revenue and Forests Department, according to which it was clarified that narpatti, chatai, petara (bamboo carpet) are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4)(b)(i).
Judgement:
- It is held that the expression forest produce does not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally different from forest produce, having a distinct character.
- In the case of Suresh Lohiya Vs State of Maharashtra, the Apex Court was considering as to whether bamboo mat is a forest produce or not and the Court has held that bamboo mat is not a forest produce in the eye of law.
Case: Suresh Lohiya vs State of Maharashtra - 1993 (1) BomCR 337, 1993 CriLJ 1557, 1993 (1) MhLj 108
- Bamboo mat has been confiscated from Suresh Lohia (the appellant) citing that it is a forest produce.
- Lower court quashed the confiscation order.
- But the Bombay High court reversed the order and said that bamboo mat is a forest produce.
Judgment:
- The term produce of tree mentioned in sec 2(4)(b)(i) refers to natural growth or product like flowers and fruits.
- Bamboo mat cannot be included under that.
- Though bamboo as a whole is forest produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce.
- Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression forest produce as defined in Section 2(4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature.
The order of confiscation passed by the Conservator of Forest was not in accordance with law.
Case: State of Uttar Pradesh vs District Judge, Bijnor and Others - AIR 1981 All 205
-The village Shahnagar Kurali falls within Reserved forest and river Ramganga flows through the reserved forest.
- Abdul Latif- representative of fishermen Biradari of village Shahnagar Kurali, made an application before the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 12 for the grant of fishing right free of charge in the river Ramganga to the fishermen of the village.
- The Divisional Forest Officer filed a written statement asserting that the fishermen are not entitled to any customary right of fishing. But the Forest Settlement Officer granted fishing rights free of cost to the villagers.
- Later on appeal the district judged confirmed the fishing right of the villagers. Aggrieved the State Government has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Contention:
Fish is not a forest produce and so the Forest Settlement Officer had no jurisdiction to grant any customary right to the fishermen under Section 12 of the Act
Judgement:
- It is a matter of common knowledge that water channels, ponds and lakes (where) fish is produced by natural process. If such water channels, ponds or lakes or rivers fall within the area of the reserved forest, any fishing in such water channels, lakes or ponds would naturally be subject to the effect of a notification issued under Section 20 of the Act.
- The definition under section 2(4)is not exhaustive instead it is inclusive. Legislative intent appears to be that anything produced or found in the forest would be forest produce. The produce need not be confined to trees, plants, or bushes, but it relates to soil, minerals and animals also. The test appears to be that any article or the thing which is ordinarily found in forest shall be treated as forest produce. It, therefore, follows that all articles or goods which are produced or found in the forest would be forest produce.
- If fish is not a forest produce, no restrictions could be placed by Section 26 on fishing rights within the reserved forest. If the definition of forest produce as contained in Section 2(4) of the Act is considered, bearing in mind the provisions of Section 26(1)(i) of the Act, the legislative intent would be clear that no person can carry on fishing within the reserved area unless the same is permitted by the Forest Settlement Officer or by the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
- Fish is a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 12 of the Act and as such the Forest Settlement Officer has jurisdiction to grant fishing right in favour of the fishermen of the village.
This decision was overturned in Sheikh Taurif vs State of Madhya Pradesh.